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THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
OR SELF-RESTRAINT?
ARCHIBALD COX*

It was on September 17, 1787, that stout, old Ben Franklin's
sedan chair was carried up the steps of Independence Hall for the
signing of a proposed new Constitution. Franklin wept as he
signed. He had labored unsuccessfully for a lifetime to bring the
North American Colonies together. Each movement towards union
had been overwhelmed by difficulties in travel and communication;
by fierce local pride and jealousy nurtured by differences in environment, custom, and religion; by clashes of economic interest; and,
after throwing off British rule at least for a moment, by unwillingness to surrender even an iota of local independence to new central
rule. For four hot and humid months the Convention had often teetered on the brink of dissolution. George Washington would write
his friend Lafayette, calling the final agreement a miracle.
Today everything has changed except the Constitution. Where
there were some 3,000,000 people scattered along the seaboard and
piedmont with a few tentacles reaching out through the Appalachian
passes, now there are 240,000,000 people spanning an area ten
times broader. Communication is instantaneous. Markets are nationwide. No words can summarize the scientific discoveries, the
technological and economic revolutions, and the rise in the standard
of living. Compare the single blacksmith at his forge with the armies
of skilled men in gigantic mills of the United States Steel Corporation. In other lands scores of written constitutions have been
adopted and then thrown on the junk pile of history. Yet the Constitution of the United States, with few important changes, still provides not only a practical outline of the structure, powers, and limits
of government, but also a spiritual lodestar to which Americans
turn.
How are we to explain this second, greater miracle? The question is relevant to our topic because part of the explanation of the
second miracle is the unique process of constitutional interpretation
by an independent judiciary headed by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The process-as I believe that I can show-usually
* Carl M. Loeb University Professor Emeritus, Harvard University; Visiting Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B., Harvard University, 1934; LL.B., 1937.
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avoided the extremes of either judicial activism or judicial restraint,
and thus kept the Constitution a living instrument relevant to a constantly changing society while also preserving the authority of the
original document and constitutional traditions of the past.
I.
The framers had a remarkable capacity for saying enough but
not too much. They devised a unique form of federation, blending
unity and diversity. For the frame of the new federal government
they looked to representative democracy and the separation of powers. Four years later they wrote down in the Bill of Rights our basic
guarantees of individual liberty against government oppression.'
The Civil War Amendments added a federal guarantee of "life, liberty, and property" against state interference in very general words
and also proscribed state denials of "equal protection of the laws." 2
In all three areas the framers laid out essential principles, sometimes in very specific terms, but often in general, majestic phrases
like "the freedom of speech," 3 "due process of law," 4 and "Commerce ... among the several States" 5-phrases that invoke historic
ideals, fix limits, and give a sense of direction, yet leave important
questions open for the future to decide. These phrases reflect principles to be particularized and questions upon which the framers
could not agree and others which they could not foresee.
The questions left to the future by the framers fell to the courts,
and ultimately to the Supreme Court, to decide whenever the questions arose in a justiciable case or controversy. 6 History leaves
doubt as to how far this key disposition was the result of design, or
of chance and the genius of John Marshall. At least some of the
framers planned it that way. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist
No. 78 explained that constitutional limitations "can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium of the courts ofjustice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void."' 7 Hamilton also foresaw that
the courts, in exercising the power of judicial review, would be
1. U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

4. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 228 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairchild 2d ed. 1981).
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"bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define
and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them." 8
Here Hamilton, himself a lawyer, was undoubtedly referring to
the traditional English common-law method of decision in which all
early American lawyers and judges were trained. Courts, the theory
ran, decide one case at a time. The decision becomes a binding precedent for every future case upon facts that are the same in all material respects as in the previous case. Future decisions should also be
consistent with the reasoning supporting or logically necessary to
support the first decision. Over time, therefore, the field once open
to discretion was gradually narrowed, and the prospect of extrapolating a broader principle by the inductive method of science developed. The principle could then be applied by deductive reasoning
to new particular instances.
Nevertheless, the rule that each case is to be decided upon its
own facts and that precedents are binding only when the relevant
facts are identical left room for change and growth. Later generations ofjudges could determine for themselves what had been critical among the facts in earlier cases. They could supply their own
rationale for earlier decisions and take account of changes in societal conditions. The common law has thus experienced centuries of
change and growth.
In constitutional adjudication the courts' initial guideposts were
the words and purposes of the instrument. As decisions were rendered, they became precedents to be linked into a continuing body
of law. As the country changed, more new questions arose concerning both individual rights and the distribution of power between the
Nation and the states. The issues divided powerful interests. They
aroused strong emotions. But with time and good fortune the Constitution had become the symbol of the traditions, the successes,
and the ideals of the American people. By demonstrating that its
judgments were indeed the authentic voice of a body of principles
reaching back through the past to the sacred instrument, the Court,
despite false starts and a few egregious blunders, was able down
through the years to resolve the great, divisive constitutional issues
in ways that commanded the assent of the country yet also met its
current needs and aspirations. Continuity was preserved, but the
continuity was creative.
I shall return to this theme and try to illustrate it further, but it
8. Id. at 233.
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seems appropriate next to say a word about the storm of controversy that currently rages about the Court. Such storms have appeared throughout our history, but the current debate is as intense
and raises as fundamental questions as any in history, excepting
only the Jeffersonians' attack upon the entire power of judicial review and their effort to subject the Court to the Congress by
impeachment.
II.
The varieties of current opinion concerning the proper role of
the Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation can best be pictured by imagining two lines drawn horizontally from left to right
across a piece of graph paper, each linking two magnetic poles, pulling Justices and observers in opposite directions.
One line marks the range of fundamental differences of temperament and philosophy that divide us all in greater or lesser degree
throughout the whole realm of politics and government. The division is suggested by the loose terms "Conservative" at the right
hand pole and "Liberal" at the left. The political liberals tend in
varying degrees to see the proper role of all branches of government as the active promotion of human freedom and equality. Extending from the center towards the politically conservative pole are
those who in varying degrees are attached to settled ways and institutions, who place great stress upon government authority to preserve security and order, but who insist that the proper role of
government is confined to the preservation of public order, health,
safety, and morality. The political conservatives leave opportunities
for human development to individual initiative in the private sector,
controlled only by the forces of a free market.
The second line on my graph paper runs between the two opposite poles of opinion concerning the proper institutional role of
the Court and the process of constitutional interpretation.
One extreme views the Court as a political body actually and
properly engaged in pursuing policy goals, even though somewhat
limited by jurisdictional rules and by the tradition of cloaking judicial policymaking in the concepts of the legal profession. This is
often described as an "activist" view of the judicial function. It can
be said to "politicize" the process of constitutional interpretation.
Especially noteworthy is that the judicial activists are not limited to
political liberals. The strong political conservative may also be a
strong judicial activist. The mark of the extreme judicial activist is
the belief that law is only policy' and that the judge should concen-
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trate on building the good society according to the judge's own
vision.
Extending toward the opposite pole on our institutional axis
are those who are attracted in varying degrees to a limited view of
the nature of the judicial process. Those compelled by this view,
often called "judicial self-restraint," stress one or more of four
considerations.
First, they highlight the values of representative self-government and majority rule-of government by consent of the governed-which require the Court, an oligarchical body, to proceed
slowly in imposing its social, economic, or political views upon the
country under vague constitutional phrases such as "due process"
and "the equal protection of the laws."
Second, they point to the values of a federal system that provides
for decentralized decisionmaking through state and local governments which require the Court, a national body, to proceed slowly
in using vague constitutional phrases to set aside state laws or local
ordinances in favor of national rules.
Third, proponents of judicial self-restraint assert that an accumulated body of wisdom expressed in the precedents and other
sources of law, built up step by step by judges and constitutional
custom, is a better guide to the wise resolution of constitutional
questions than the individual views of one judge or even a majority
of nine Justices.
Fourth, and most important, they assert the need to assure the
effectiveness of the rulings of an institution charged with enforcing
constitutional limitations against the popularly elected executive
and legislative branches. Lacking power of the purse or the sword,
the Court must rely upon the power of legitimacy-upon the capacity to evoke uncoerced assent and strong public support. How else
could a President be forced to return the steel mills to their owners
in response to a constitutional decision, as President Truman was
required to do despite a Presidential seizure in time of war?9 Only
public support for the Court's decision forced President Nixon to
abandon his defiance of a judicial subpoena for the Watergate
tapes.'°
The power of legitimacy has many springs. One source in the
beginning was a link between law and divine command, or "natural
law." Later, after experience under royal despots, came the practi9. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
10. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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cal judgment that courts and law were the best safeguards against
executive or legislative violations of liberty. Constitutional law has
long drawn strength from traditional and evocative precepts that
symbolize the historic struggles for freedom from government oppression: "Liberty under Law," for example, and "A government of
laws, not of men." The link to the Constitution is important, perhaps because it suggests a delegated authority, but especially because it evokes an historic sense of the common and continuing
ideals, the common success, and common purposes of the American
people. But the essence of law is that it binds everyone. To command an uncoerced allegiance while lacking the sanction of majoritarianism, law must not only apply to all people equally-not just
today but yesterday and tomorrow-but, above all, it must bind the
judges as well as the judged.
On the extreme right along the second line on our graph paper
fall those who see law as a static set of rules derived by logical deduction from the words and concepts found in precedents and secondary sources of law, paying scant attention to the underlying
social and economic conditions.
To complete the picture one must imagine that the two axes on
our graph paper lie close enough together for the fields of force to
overlap. The judge or observer who is strongly attracted toward
either the conservative or liberal pole on the political axis will be
pulled back toward a more moderate net position if he also feels
strongly attracted toward the pole of judicial restraint along the institutional axis. Conversely, the judge or observer who believes that
law is chiefly policy that courts enforce and that the Supreme Court
is, within its jurisdiction, essentially a political instrument, will feel
relatively free to decide a case or to appraise a decision according to
his or her place upon the political axis.
My own view of the proper role of the Supreme Court places
me somewhat on the liberal side of the political axis, near the center
of the institutional axis and, because of the importance I attribute to
long-range institutional concerns, near the center on the whole. I
can describe it best by quoting from my greater master, Judge
Learned Hand. In speaking of Cardozo and the common-law
judge's duty to find a decision in a continuing body of law, Judge
Hand stressed the link between the judge's power to bind and the
judge's adherence to law:
His authority and immunity depend upon the assumption
that he speaks with the mouth of others: the momentum of
his utterances must be greater than any which his personal
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reputation and character can command, if it is... to stand
against the passionate resentments arising out of the interests he must frustrate."
Yet law cannot be static if it is to meet the needs of society.
"[T]he customary law of English-speaking peoples stands," Judge
Hand went on to say, "a structure indubitably made by the hands of
generations of judges." A judge, he concluded, "must manage to
escape both horns of this dilemma: he must preserve his authority
by cloaking himself in the majesty of an overshadowing past; but he
must discover some composition with the dominant trends of his
time. '"12
The final dilemma is much the same in constitutional adjudication even though the restraints upon the judge may be somewhat
greater because the values of state autonomy and majority rule
enter the balance. But I think that Judge Hand would agree that
often-though not always-both branches of the antinomy can be
served and the horns of the dilemma avoided by eschewing a woodenly logical reading of the written law, by looking behind the formal
concepts to realities of the context and the underlying ideals and
purposes, and by then applying the old ideals and purposes to new
realities with a sensitive understanding of their human significance.
The history of the Court and the Constitution illustrates the complex interplay of these forces.
III.
From 1789 until 1865, in dealing with the then critical questions concerning the nature of the new federal system, the Court
saw its task as limited to interpretation of the words of a written
document, but the style of interpretation, especially under Chief
Justice Marshall, was active and creative. Both the text and the "intent" were interpreted broadly: "[W]e must never forget, that it is a
Constitution we are expounding."' 3 The honest search for the framers' purposes and their conscientious particularization in the case at
hand limited the Justices, but, because the purposes were general
and the framers were not wholly of one mind, the identification and
particularization required the Justices to make conscious choices according to a vision of the country's needs and potential.' 4 Yet the
11. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (1939).
12. Id.
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1816).
14. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (negative
implications of the commerce clause); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
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vision was not the Court's alone. In expanding national power the
Court was moving in step with the dominant trend in the political
branches; therefore it rarely had need to face the institutional problem of majoritarianism. The single notable exception, the Dred Scott
case, 5 has long been seen as a tragic judicial blunder into the political realm.
After 1870 America changed from a land of frontiersmen, farmers, small merchants, and artisans into an enormously complex, reticulated economy, largely industrialized, urbanized, and filled with
aggregations of people and property carrying tremendous economic
power. The regulatory and welfare state began to emerge in response to the pressure for government to redress imbalances of private power and thus protect the health, safety, and welfare, and so
the liberty, of those unable to protect themselves in unremitting
contests for economic power.
At first the Court asserted that the Constitution forbade the
change, forbade not only federal regulation of the production and
local distribution of goods' 6 but also government interference,
7
either state or federal, with the essentials of liberty of contract.'
On the political line running from a strongly conservative political
philosophy on the right to strong liberalism on the left, the decisions fell well on the conservative side.
The decisions are also often presented as examples of the dangers ofjudicial activism. In invalidating a federal income tax,18 minimum wage laws,' 9 price regulation, 0 and protection for union
members, 2 ' the Court did indeed go far to impose uniform judgemade rules upon the country in place of determinations made by
majorities of the people through representative government.
I am inclined to think, however, that the decisions of that era
are better characterized as examples of the harm done by a highly
verbal and conceptual, and therefore static, jurisprudence, pursued
by Justices who did not understand the changes sweeping the country. The decisions denying Congress power under the commerce
(same); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1816) (implied powers of

Congress).
15. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
16. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
17. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
18. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
19. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
20. Ribnick v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
21. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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clause to regulate anything more than interstate transportation pursued a policy of "strict construction" by denying Congress power
not plainly granted by the words of the Constitution and by adhering to the almost certain supposition of the framers that they had
withheld from Congress the power to regulate "production" as they
knew it and its effects upon the economy.2 2 In fact, vast industrial
changes had revolutionized both the meaning of production and its
practical interstate consequences. Similarly, in protecting economic
liberty and property the Court woodenly applied words and concepts that had long been parts of the American legal and political
tradition without regard to the difference between their original
context and the new economic realities. Liberty of contract in an
artisan's negotiations with prospective employers in the cities and
towns of 1800 had strikingly different practical, human significance
than in an immigrant steelworker's negotiations with United States
Steel Corporation a century later. The decisions failed to meet the
country's needs because of unimaginative emphasis upon the verbal
logic of the law stated in precedents at the expense of "some composition with the dominant trends of [the] time[s]." 2 3
The reaction climaxed in 1937. The Court swung over to a period of judicial restraint marked by extreme deference to the political process and to the values of state and local autonomy. An act of
Congress regulating local production or distribution would be held
to exceed federal power only if it were demonstrated that the activities regulated could not rationally be found to affect interstate commerce even in their cumulative effect.24 A state or federal law would
be held to violate the due process clause only if the challengers
demonstrated that the measure bore no rational relation to any reasonable view of the public interest.2 5 In 1937 and for the next few
years the pull of the liberal pole of the political axis reinforced the
pull of forces counselling judicial conservatism in defining the role
of the Court. The dominant political philosophy in the executive
and legislative branches, and in the industrial states, was much more
liberal than that of the judicial branch.
The years following World War II brought a realignment of
forces. The multiplication and magnification of government activities increased sensitivity to threats to civil liberty. Humanitarianism,
22. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
23. Hand, supra note 11, at 361.
24. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
25. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 294 (1964).
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aided by the prevailing teachings of the psychological and social sciences, cast doubt upon the sterner aspects of criminal law. A wave
of egalitarianism flowed from the historic impulse of the American
people, stirred by the war against Hitler's ideas of a "master race"
and by the rise of the peoples of Asia and Africa. A wave of emancipation reflected wide dissatisfaction with social, moral, and legal
constraints upon the individual. The Court became the branch of
government in which the libertarian, egalitarian, and humanitarian
impulses beat the strongest. In the new milieu the polar forces of
liberal political philosophy and institutional restraint pulled in opposite directions, but the latter was weakening and the pull of judicial activism was growing stronger because more and more
members of the legal profession, especially professors and law students, came to question the reality of the old ideal of law. The Justices began to assert with new vigor the Court's responsibility for
protecting individual human liberties, including equality of opportunity and individual dignity.
Measured in institutional terms, the constitutional decisions
of the Warren and early Burger Courts had five dominant
characteristics.
First, often invoking the doctrine of "strict judicial scrutiny" instead of the permissive rationality test, the Court substituted judicial
rules, resting upon judicially determined values, for the values determined and rules laid down by elected representatives of the people. The most dramatic examples are the reapportionment2 6 and
abortion cases,2 7 but the same characteristic runs strongly in cases
involving freedom of speech, 28 of association,2 9 and of religion.3 °
Second, in protecting individual rights the Court repeatedly substituted national rules-said to be derived from the Constitutionin the place of state law and the decisions of local authorities such as
school boards. The best examples are the cases enlarging the rights
of the accused in state criminal prosecutions.31
Third, the decisions overruled precedents and made new law
upon an extensive scale, and so were open to the charge that the
26. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).

27.
28.
29.
(1967).
30.
31.
(1961).

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
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Court was no longer deciding "according to law." The expansion of
"freedom of speech,"31 2 of "equal protection,"3 3 and of the procedural rights of the accused in criminal cases 34 serve as examples.
Fourth, the Court encouraged constitutional litigation by easing
access to the federal courts in constitutional cases 35 and also by
loosening the rules determining whether, when, and upon whose
complaint a court will decide a constitutional question. 36
Fifth, and most important, the new decisions mandated major
institutional changes not only in the administration of justice but in
the larger society. In the past the Court had invoked the Constitution chiefly as an instrument of continuity. Decisions holding acts
unconstitutional had done no more than uphold or block legislative
or executive initiatives. From 1950 to 1974 the Court used the Constitution to mandate change, without legislative support. The desegregation cases reordered large regions of society.3 7 The
reapportionment cases upset ancient political arrangements.3 8 The
school prayer cases banished a practice familiar to generations of
Americans. 39 The Constitution had been made into an affirmative
instrument of massive reforms.
Effectuation of such reforms required the courts to enter decrees with many of the characteristics of legislation and which called
for continuing administration. The school busing decrees are the
best examples, but in many places federal judges have intervened to
supervise large parts of the management of state prisons, mental
health institutions, welfare programs, public housing, and even the
cleaning up of environmental hazards. 40
In the conservative political mood of the 1970s and 1980s, such
active and expansive use of judicial power to mandate societal
change was bound to arouse intense political and professional criti32. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
34. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
35. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
39. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
40. This development is described in Cox, The Effect of the Search for Equality upon
JudicialInstitutions, 1979 WASH. L. REV. 795.
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cism. Initially, Brown v. Board of Education 4' set off cries of "massive
resistance." 42 Even today acceptance is not everywhere wholehearted. Busing to achieve school integration still faces strong opposition. Affirmative action is widely condemned. The school
prayer cases 43 came as a shock, upsetting established ways. The
emotional demand for returning an orthodox God to the classroom
remains intense. Roe v. Wade4 4 deeply offends religious and moral
convictions. Expanded protection for persons accused of crime
runs against a growing demand for law and order.
The ranks of the conservative policy-oriented critics have been
greatly strengthened by institutional critics of excessive judicial activism. The conservatives on the political axis who might be judicial
activists if they were in the saddle and the true advocates of strong
judicial restraint can join hands in damning creative decisions of a
liberal cast.
In my opinion, the decisions of the Warren and early Burger
years, viewed as a whole, made ours a vastly more humane society,
one freer, more equal, and more respectful of the human dignity of
every individual-all very much in keeping with the main current of
American history. I also think that, when taken by itself, each of the
great decisions, except the abortion rulings, can be shown to have
had adequate roots in our evolving constitutional tradition.
Whether, taking the decisions as a whole, the Court endangered its
legitimacy by swinging so far toward the activist pole of the institutional line on our graph paper so often seems to me to depend upon
the success of the effort of the politically conservative right to control the future and undo a wide range of decisions by carefully tailoring appointments to the federal bench and then counting upon
the new judges to reverse the course of constitutional law.
Before looking to the future, let me first explain why I think
each of the great decisions, except the abortion cases, is, when
viewed apart from the whole complex, consistent with a sound view
of the nature of constitutional adjudication. The explanation may
also throw some light upon the current debate over how far the
Court is bound by the framers' "original intent."

41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 496 n.2 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing school desegregation).
43. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
44. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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IV.
Loyalty to the "original intent" is obviously one of those links
to the past that prevents a judge from roaming at large and gives
authenticity to his decisions if the intent can be reliably ascertained.
But before we can think intelligently about "original intent" or the
"intent of the framers," we have to determine the meaning of these
words.
Those who advocate interpreting the broad, open-ended
phrases of the Constitution according to the "original intent" seem
to me to be saying that the Court should confine the grants of federal power and the guarantees of individual rights to the particular
instances that the framers specifically had in mind. A second meaning of "original intent" is at least possible. The very nature of the
document and the use of general, majestic phrases requiring later
particularization argue that the framers' intention embraced
broader purposes, principles, or policies that a court may consciously search out and apply to particular questions which had been
deliberately left open or were altogether unforeseen. The Court's
pursuit of this second meaning of "original intent" through most of
our history goes far to explain why the original document has served
and still serves so well through two centuries of extraordinary
change.
Consider a few examples. If we could ask the delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention whether they had particularly intended to
forbid electronic eavesdropping by government agents, their answer
obviously would be, "No, we had never heard of electronic bugs."
The framers were thinking only of physical trespasses. To give the
fourth amendment only the literal scope of their conscious realization means that its guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures give no protection against electronic bugging.4 5 But if we
look behind the specifics to the underlying purpose, surely the
"original intent" was to guarantee the privacy of our papers and our
conversations in our homes and offices against all warrantless governmental intrusions-not merely against government agents who
break in and hide in the closet.4"
45. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 459 (1928) (use of incriminating
telephone conversation overheard by government officers using unauthorized wiretap as
government evidence in criminal trial does not unconstitutionally compel the accused to
produce private papers or to be a witness against himself).
46. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (evidence obtained by use of
an electronic recording device attached to the outside of a telephone booth from which
criminal defendant was known to make calls violated privacy upon which defendant rea-
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Desegregation furnishes a second example. No one has ever
made a persuasive case for an affirmative answer to the question:
"Did the Congress that recommended the fourteenth amendment
and the state legislatures that ratified it consciously and specifically
intend to abolish school segregation?" If this were the test, Brown v.
Board of Education4 7 is an instance of judicial usurpation. I submit,
however, that one charged with applying the fourteenth amendment
to a statute mandating school desegregation almost a century after
its adoption should go on to ask what was the "intent" in the broad
sense of purpose or policy, and he or she must then consider how
that purpose applies to state-mandated racial segregation with the
knowledge we have today and under the circumstances of the present time. The broad purpose was surely to secure for all individuals
the same right to human dignity and equal standing before government regardless of race or color. And even if it were possible in
earlier years to view state-mandated segregation upon common carriers as imposing no governmental stamp of inferiority upon black
people, 48 that surely could not be said in 1954 of the system of official segregation then pervading the laws of many states. By those
laws the states were denying equal treatment at the hands of government. In this proper sense the desegregation decisions were consistent with the original intent.
My view, in short, is that when the words are inconclusive,
sound constitutional interpretation requires searching out the
broad, underlying, and enduring purposes of the instrument and its
framers, and then applying them to the modern particular with full
understanding of the conditions of our times. Precedents should be
applied or distinguished in like fashion. Decisions thus linked to the
sacred instrument will carry the authority of the overshadowing past
and usually will also meet the needs of our present times.
Of course, this is not the end of the problem. Ascertaining and
defining the underlying purpose or policy with enough precision to
decide concrete cases may require a kind of judicial choice illustrated by the decision two years ago holding Alabama's school
prayer and moment of silence statute to be an unconstitutional law
"respecting an establishment of religion" because it encouraged
sonably relied and constituted "search and seizure" within meaning of fourth
amendment).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (state statute requiring railway
companies to provide, inter alia, separate, but equal, accommodations for blacks and
whites not in conflict with thirteenth or fourteenth amendments).
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prayer.4 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, dissented upon the ground that the original intent of the establishment
clause was not to require government neutrality between religion
and irreligion. He took as authoritative evidence of that original intentJustice Story's assertion that "the real object of the Amendment
was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or
Judaism, or infidelity by prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all
rivalry among Christian sects." 50
The key question seems to me to lie much deeper, although I
accept Justice Story's statement as an accurate description of the
framers' conscious thinking. In the America of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries there was scant reason to choose between neutrality among Christian sects and total neutrality in the
realm of spirit as between all beliefs, unbelief, and disbelief. Almost
everyone was a Christian. Now the choice has become important.
The world has broadened and the diversities of belief and nonbelief
among the American people are many times greater than in the
Western World of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today,
we include many Jews, Buddhists, deists, members of the Ethical
Culture Society and other humanistic groups, unbelievers, and disbelievers. All are members of the community. The key question
concerning school prayer becomes whether the original framers, if
brought before us today, would tell us to be guided in today's
America by the verbal limits of Justice Story's exposition or would
say that underlying their particular manifestations, and perhaps not
fully appreciated by them because of the limits of their experience,
lay the broader principle that government should not promote any
religious orthodoxy, belief, or unbelief.
Recorded history will answer this question only for the literalminded. The wise judge in keeping the Constitution a viable instrument suited to the needs of an ever-changing society will not often
break away from the original purposes. In coming to understand
the current application of their original meaning, however, he must
bring to the process a sense of the circumstances and needs of both
earlier and contemporary times. In the instance of the establishment clause the implications of the framers' theme seem to me, and
have seemed to the Court, to be far broader than they do to Chief
Justice Rehnquist. But I must admit-indeed emphasize-that my
understanding, like the Court's decision, includes an element of
49. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
50. Id. at 2515 (quoting J.STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES
(5th ed. 1891)).
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choice.'
From time to time the Warren and early Burger Courts pressed
beyond the limits of the "original intent," even when that phrase is
understood as I have defined it and the framers' expressions are interpreted in accordance with the circumstances of our times. Sometimes, but rarely, such decisions are commendable. The cases
holding that sex discrimination violates the equal protection clause
furnish an example. 5 2 Discrimination against women had been woven into the fabric of our laws and attitudes from the beginning. No
matter how "original intent" is defined, no one can honestly say that
the men who wrote the equal protection clause in 1869 "intended"
to require the government and the law to treat men and women
alike. The limits the framers put upon "equality" are as much a part
of the "intent" as their affirmations. Nor can one argue with much
conviction that laws discriminating against women had different effects in the 1960s and 1970s than they did in the prior century. Our
ideas had changed, but the very most that one can do in order to
relate the modern sex discrimination cases to history is to say that,
despite contrary practices, the seed of equality of treatment for women had always been implicit in our historic ideals of human equality and dignity. This seed was waiting to flower, much like the seed
of equality regardless of race or color, and the Court struck a responsive chord in the American people by pursuing the analogy
even though it went contrary to precedent and the "original intent."

Similarly, even though I applaud the one person, one vote decisions,5 3 it strikes me as intellectually dishonest to argue that they
give effect to the authors' and the supporters' understanding of the
equal protection clause, or even to their broad "purpose" however
defined. But the Court did draw upon the past even as it reshaped
the present. Beneath the familiar practices of unequal apportionment that the framers regarded as consistent with equal protection,
51. Judge Hand observed:
Life overflows its moulds and the will outstrips its own universals. Men cannot
know their own meaning until the variety of its manifestations is disclosed in its
final impacts, and the full content of no design is grasped till it has got beyond
its general formulation and become differentiated in its last incidence. It
should be, and it may be, the function of the profession to manifest such purposes in their completeness if it can achieve the genuine loyalty which comes
not from obedience, but from the according will, for interpretation is a mode of
the will and understanding is a choice.
L. HAND, The Speech ofJustice, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 18 (3d ed. 1974).
52. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
53. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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there had always run a deep current of essential political egalitarianism to which the Court gave further impulse by removing an old
limitation. Justice Douglas made the point succinctly: "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence,
to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments, can mean only one thing-one person,
one vote." 5 4
In these most creative instances wise constitutional adjudication
seems to me to draw its legitimacy from, and be limited by, a delicate symbiotic relation. The opinions shape the Nation's understanding of itself. They tell us what we are by reminding us of what
we might be. But the aspirations voiced by the Court must be those
that we the people are willing not only to avow, but in the end to live
by. The legitimacy of the decision depends upon the accuracy of the
Justices' perception of this kind of common will, a will outside themselves, and upon the Court's ability by expressing the perception to
strike a responsive chord equivalent to the consent of the governed.
To go further, to impose the Court's own wiser choice, is
illegitimate.
V.
It is illegitimate too, I think, to break the limits of continuing
constitutional traditions in this fashion very often, because breaks
with continuity strain the very idea of law. For this reason, we have
to ask in the end whether the Warren and early Burger Courts went
too far, too fast, too often in shaping constitutional law to what a
majority of the Justices supposed to be the needs of a just and humane society and, therefore, undermined the sources of their own
legitimacy. I fear that they created grave risk, but in my judgment
the outcome will depend upon whether the result of the counterreform movement led by President Reagan and Attorney General
Meese is that the people come to see the Court as just another political body or that they rightly continue to honor its decisions as made
"according to law."
The threat of politicization comes from several directions, but
perhaps most notably from the executive branch under President
Reagan. In making judicial appointments the President, Attorney
General Meese, and their aides present courts to the public as just
another set of political bodies whose decisions depend wholly upon
the political ideology of the judge. The rhetoric is even more dam54. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962).
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aging. The Attorney General's lecture at Tulane University last October asserted: "The Court's decisions do not establish a 'supreme
law of the land' but are binding only upon the parties." '5 5 The statement contains elements of technical accuracy, but the implication
that all others, including tens of thousands of state and federal officials, are free to disregard the Court's decisions would, if followed,
destroy our constitutionalism.
Presidents may take appointees' political and judicial philosophy into account in selecting judges, and many have done so, but
none before seem to have gone as far in that direction as the present
administration. Making or appearing to make appointments simply
with an eye to obtaining a predictable vote on policy grounds tends
to weaken public belief in "law," and also to make the actual style of
decisionmaking still more political. Heightened public perception
of the political quality of decisions would fuel demands for political
appointments. The cycle would inevitably lead to pressure for the
election ofJustices and judges. After all, if key court decisions really
are little different from the determinations of policy by other
branches of government, why should not the voters elect the Justices and judges for terms of years?
The view of the Court presented to the people by the media
also tends to politicize. Unfortunately, very few reporters understand or have the time or space to describe the complexity of the
judicial process. The issues are almost always oversimplified. Outcomes are given political labels-liberal or conservative.
Whether constitutional adjudication is further politicized and
the Court loses the power to act as James Madison's bulwark against
legislative or executive oppression may ultimately depend upon the
way the next set of Justices performs its function. The Warren and
early Burger Courts, as I have said, swung pretty far toward the policymaking side. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, and any other newJustices of a strongly conservative political
bent, if they become a majority, will have to choose between institutional restraint and a form of judicial activism not very different
from the activism of their immediate predecessors, albeit in pursuit
of conservative rather than liberal policy goals. The affirmative action, campaign finance, and other scattered cases suggest that the
ChiefJustice, for one, can be a strong activist when his political con-

55. E. Meese, The Law of the Constitution 12-13 (Oct. 21, 1986) (lecture delivered
at The Tulane University Citizen's Forum on the Bicentennial of the Constitution)
(available at the Alay1and Law Review).
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victions are at stake.5 6
The necessity for choice will arise because the constitutional
rights to which political conservatives object are now so much a part
of the fabric of existing law that changing them would be making
new law to suit policy preferences. Roe v. Wade,5 7 the first of the
abortion rulings, was decided in 1973. For fourteen years the decision has been followed and reaffirmed.5" The first school prayer decision of the Supreme Court was handed down twenty-five years
ago; 59 its roots go back to the 1940s.' The counter-reformists' major goals also include reducing the present constitutional protection
for persons accused of crime. The decisions to which they object go
back twenty or thirty years. 6 ' School desegregation, by busing if
necessary, became the standard judicial remedy for unconstitutional
school segregation in the 1960s. The Reagan administration's position on affirmative action has been partly rejected.6 2 One school of
thought on the right seeks to sweep away all the New Deal and other
regulatory agencies whose members serve for fixed terms beyond
the President's discretionary power of removal, on the ground that
the Constitution bars Congress from delegating power to any official other than the President or other "officer of the United States"
whom the President has discretion both to choose and remove. The
constitutionality of denying the President discretionary power to remove the members of independent agencies to which Congress had
delegated mixtures of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power was
upheld as long ago as 1935,63 and a large part of the business of the
federal government has been regularly conducted upon this
foundation.
The overruling of even the shortest of the lines of settled lawthe abortion cases-could doubtless be absorbed. Some overruling
of precedent is part of the constitutional tradition. The message
56. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
57. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. See. e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986);
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
59. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
60. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (use of public school building for religious teaching violates first amendment).
61. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
62. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063
(1986).
63. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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would become dangerously loud and clear, however, if the reversals
spread. The example would go far to encourage a swing back to the
law as it stands today if a second new majority should result from a
second wave of new appointments, next time by a more liberal President. Constitutionalism as practiced in the past could not survive
if, as a result of a succession of carefully chosen Presidential appointments, the sentiment of a majority of the Justices shifted back
and forth at five- or ten-year intervals so that the rights to freedom
of choice, freedom from state-mandated prayer, and the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence were alternately recognized and
denied.
In the long run, I suppose, the future of our constitutionalism
depends upon whether we, the people of the United States, continue to believe that men and women in power, including judges,
should govern themselves by "law." By "law" I mean a set of established governing principles. They are not neutral-call them "values," "policies," or "standards," if you prefer. They have a
separate existence and command an allegiance greater than that due
any individual merely by virtue of office or personal prestige, however strong or wise. Nor are they static. The law, even as it honors
the past, must reach for justice of a kind not measured by force, by
the pressures of interest groups, nor even by votes, but only by what
reason and a sense of justice say is right. The judge must strive to
understand, not to impose his preferences.
In academic circles today, and perhaps throughout the legal
profession, there is a strong tendency to decry the ideal of law as an
independent force and to view the judges simply as the makers and
remakers of social policy. It is tempting to poke fun at the notion of
law as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." 6 4 It is easy to demonstrate that the law books that guide them have always left judges
important opportunities for choice and that judges change the law
from time to time, not only superficially as when new conditions require the formal restatement of an old rule, but fundamentally in
keeping with changes as the ideals of the society develop.
Perhaps, the philosophy calling itself "realism" will prevail, but
in my view the easy and convincing proof that the Court can, does,
and should sometimes make law in constitutional adjudication falls
short of demonstrating that the justices are in nowise bound by law.
Proof that resort to the words of the Constitution sometimes provides scant guidance fails to demonstrate that the Justices are free to
64. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
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interpolate whatever they will. Similarly, judges can feel, and therefore be, limited by an ever-constant, ever-changing body of law even
though there is room for choice. The task calls for judgments of
balance and degree mindful of both branches of the basic antinomy.
That the basic antinomy, the tension between continuity and creativity, cannot be resolved nor the balance struck with certainty does
not disprove the value of the effort. Dedicated pursuit of an ideal is
a legitimating reality, even though the reach exceeds the grasp, provided that the people know that the effort is undertaken. And the
value of the ideal is not diminished by acknowledging that its conscientious pursuit serves the utilitarian function of giving legitimacy to
constitutional decisions.
VI.
The final answer to the question-"Why has the Constitution,
written 200 years ago, served so long so well?"-lies in the character of the American people. Idealistic yet pragmatic, they had from
the beginning what the Scottish-born philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead described as a "spirit of toleration and cooperation"
unique in human history. That spirit was surely a necessity of life on
the frontier, but tolerance and the will to cooperate also flowed
from a larger belief in the continuing value of the great American
adventure-despite its faults, despite our selfishness, and despite
our dim perception of the goal. For me, belief in the value of the
enterprise is an article of faith. Whether enough of us still have
enough belief in the worthwhileness of our common fate for the
spirit of tolerance and cooperation to prevail and whether we share
sufficient common ideals including belief in the rule of law with sufficient confidence will determine the survival of constitutionalism.

